The Availability Heuristic in Judgments of Research Findings: Manipulations of Subjective Experience by Shams, Michele A
University of North Florida
UNF Digital Commons
All Volumes (2001-2008) The Osprey Journal of Ideas and Inquiry
2002
The Availability Heuristic in Judgments of Research
Findings: Manipulations of Subjective Experience
Michele A. Shams
University of North Florida
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.unf.edu/ojii_volumes
Part of the Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the The Osprey
Journal of Ideas and Inquiry at UNF Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in All Volumes (2001-2008) by an authorized
administrator of UNF Digital Commons. For more information, please
contact Digital Projects.
© 2002 All Rights Reserved
Suggested Citation
Shams, Michele A., "The Availability Heuristic in Judgments of Research Findings: Manipulations of Subjective Experience" (2002).
All Volumes (2001-2008). 112.
http://digitalcommons.unf.edu/ojii_volumes/112
The Availability Heuristic in Judgments 
of Research Findings: Manipulations of 
SUbjective Experience 
Michele A. Shams 
Faculty Sponsor: Dr. Dan Richard 
Abstract 
Previous studies have demonstrated 
that what is easy to call to mind will 
influence judgments. The impact of a 
person's subjective experience was tested 
for its influence on judgments of social 
psychological research findings. Eighty-
three college students generated 
examples of 40 research findings. 
Students subsequently judged the ease 
with which the examples came to mind 
and the probability of experiencing 
similar examples. Students then 
evaluated the obviousness and 
importance of and their interest in the 
research outcomes. Students also 
provided demographic information and 
indicated their previous knowledge in 
psychology. In the current study, the ease 
with which examples of research findings 
could be recalled influenced student's 
obviousness but not importance 
judgments. Other studies found that 
obviousness and importance judgments 
of research findings are positively 
related. The relationship between these 
judgments was not replicated in the 
current study. Results are discussed in 
terms of the availability heuristic and 
other cognitive strategies involved in lay 
judgments of research. 
Introduction 
People acquire and process knowledge 
about their social world in different ways. 
One way people gain knowledge is through 
past experience. People often use their past 
experiences with others, for example, to 
develop and test lay theories (Heider, 
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1958). Scientists also develop and test 
theories about human behavior. Scientists 
and lay people, however, may think 
differently about the importance of research 
outcomes. Scientists think that if a finding 
is obvious, then it is not important to 
conduct further research on that topic. 
Studies have shown that when lay people 
think a finding is obvious, they also think 
that it is important (Richard, Bond, and 
Stokes-Zoota, 2001). Scientists conduct 
research to gain knowledge that could 
eventually be beneficial to the general 
public (Aronson, Ellsworth, Carlsmith, & 
Gonzales, 1990). In order for scientific 
information to be beneficial, scientists must 
disseminate the information to the public in 
a way that people can understand. Scientists 
must understand lay knowledge if they are 
to communicate important information to 
the public and if this information is to be 
received. The current study was designed to 
better understand how lay people interpret 
and process scientific information. 
Scientists use a defined method. They 
think critically, formulate hypotheses, and 
test theories. Psychologists believe that lay 
people think much like scientists (Heider, 
1958). People interpret and then assimilate 
new information into their existing mental 
systems through a form of hypothesis 
testing. The lay person's hypothesis testing 
is similar to a scientist's because they both 
rule out alternative possibilities. The lay 
person's hypothesis testing, however, is not 
as comprehensive as a scientist's process 
(Fiske & Taylor, 1982). 
Other studies reveal that scientists and 
lay people may differ in how they interpret 
the results of scientific hypothesis testing. 
Scientists feel that an obvious finding is not 
interesting and not important, hence not 
worthy of research. Scientists are afraid of 
wasting precious resources investigating 
topics that are already known. Research 
findings that do not appear obvious arouse 
curiosity and are investigated further 
(Aronson et aI., 1990). Lay people, 
however, may respond differently to 
research they consider surprising. Richard 
et aL (2001) investigated the differences in 
lay peoples' perceptions of social 
psychological results. Students read 398 
findings gathered from published social 
psychological research reviews. The 
researchers asked college students to make 
a judgment about each research finding. 
Some students indicated whether each 
finding was obvious or not obvious, some 
indicated whether each finding was 
interesting or not interesting, and others 
indicated whether each finding was 
important or not important. The research 
findings most college students judged as 
obvious were the findings other students 
judged as important. Although scientists 
consider obvious research as unimportant, 
lay people believe the most obvious 
research findings are the most important. 
In an effort to see if lay people and 
scientists differ drastically in how they 
evaluate research, Richard et aL (2001) 
asked students to read each research finding 
and judge whether they think the finding is 
important enough for scientists to conduct 
further research on that topic. If students 
evaluate research like social scientists, then 
findings considered obvious would be 
judged as least important for scientists to 
pursue further. The opposite occurred. 
Students indicated that it was more 
important to conduct additional research on 
obvious findings and less important to 
pursue non-obvious fmdings. Richard et 
aL's (2001) study demonstrated that what 
the lay person considers important is not 
necessarily consistent with what a scientist 
typically would consider important. 
Perhaps what a lay person believes is 
obvious is not what a scientist considers 
obvious. Scientists consider obvious what 
is already known (Aronson et aI., 1990). 
Sometimes what lay people consider an 
obvious research finding may not always be 
a true finding. People may believe, for 
example, that when it comes to romantic 
relationships, "opposites attract," but social 
psychological research has suggested that 
people become romantically involved with 
people who are similar (Feingold, 1988). 
Researchers have investigated inaccuracies 
lay people have when evaluating research. 
In Richard et aL's (2001) study, people 
accurately distinguished between true 
findings and foil findings. The research 
findings lay people find obvious, therefore, 
are the findings they can predict 
Wong (1995) also evaluated lay 
judgments of research findings. In her 
study, Wong presented students with 12 
teaching-related research findings and 
asked the students to rate the obviousness 
of each statement. People rated summaries 
that stated the opposite of actual research 
outcomes as more obvious than the original 
outcomes themselves. In addition, 
providing a rationale for a finding, whether 
it was an actual finding or an opposite 
finding, increased the degree to which 
people rated the research summary as 
obvious. Feelings of obviousness tended to 
bias a person's judgments and were not a 
good measure of accuracy when students 
judged research results. Richard et aL 
(2001) found that students can distinguish 
true findings from foil findings and that 
true findings rated as obvious also were 
accurately distinguished from foils. 
Evidence demonstrates that lay people do 
have a sense of true psychological research 
findings and that what is important to lay 
people tends to be what is obvious. 
Research has demonstrated that lay 
people do think differently than scientists 
regarding judgments of research findings. 
The way lay people make judgments of 
research and their subjective experiences 
when making these judgments can be 
important in understanding differences 
between scientists and non-scientists. 
Making a judgment about research involves 
a process rather than a single act. Strack 
(1992) introduced a model that outlines this 
judgment process. When making any 
judgment, a person goes through two 
phases: an exposure phase and a judgment 
phase. In the exposure phase, a person is 
presented with a stimulus. Concurrently, 
the person evaluates information that is 
given about the stimulus, his or her own 
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past experiences relating to the stimulus, 
and the process information (e.g. how easy 
or difficult it is for the person to think of 
experiences) relating to the stimulus. The 
exposure phase is completed before 
continuing to the judgment phase. In the 
judgment phase, the person evaluates how 
the information obtained in the exposure 
phase compares to previous knowledge 
relating to the stimulus. The person then 
checks and corrects the information for 
perceived biases. Finally, a judgment is 
made. Judgments are greatly affected by 
how past experiences and information from 
the process of making the judgment are 
integrated (see Figure 1). When making a 
judgment, people use information from past 
experiences and from what is available in 
their minds at the time of judgment. 
The Availability Heuristic 
The availability heuristic, a common 
cognitive strategy in human decision-
making, provides an example of how the 
process of making a judgment influences 
the evaluation of relevant events. People's 
judgments of probability and frequency of 
events are based on the ease with which 
examples of those events come to mind 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1973). Tversky 
and Kahneman demonstrated how ease of 
recall affects probability judgments using 
lists of famous male and female names. 
Participants reviewed a list of an equal 
number of female and male names. Some 
lists contained famous male names and 
some contained famous female names. The 
participants then made estimates of the 
frequency of male and female names. 
Famous names were more likely recalled 
and produced higher frequency estimates. 
Judgments of frequency were affected by 
what was salient in the mind of the person 
making the judgment. 
Information that is salient in one's 
mind can bias one's judgments. The 
hindsight bias occurs when people have 
previous outcome knowledge of a certain 
event and base their decisions on that 
knowledge (Slovic and Fischoff, 1977). An 
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availability heuristic is responsible for the 
hindsight bias because previous knowledge 
about a stimulus is readily available in a 
person's mind and can be retrieved to make 
a decision. 
Slovic and Fischhoff (1977) evaluated 
how lay people evaluate research and what 
factors influence the evaluation process. 
The researchers assigned participants to 
either a hindsight group or a foresight 
group. Both groups reviewed four different 
research scenarios. The investigator told the 
foresight group about two possible 
outcomes that could occur and asked them 
to predict the probability of each outcome, 
explain why it might occur, and estimate 
the likelihood of that outcome happening 
again if the study were replicated. The 
investigator told the hindsight group only 
about one of the two outcomes, asked them 
to explain why it had occurred, and had the 
students evaluate the probability that the 
research outcome would be replicated. The 
participants given one outcome estimated a 
higher probability for the results being 
replicated than did the participants who 
were given two outcomes to consider. 
In a second experiment, Slovic and 
Fishhoff (1977) tested whether hindsight 
participants responded like foresight 
participants if forced to consider two 
alternative outcomes for a research 
experiment instead of just one. The 
researchers had students consider 
alternative outcomes to an already known 
research result. Students believed that 
replicating the research outcomes was less 
probable when they considered two 
possible outcomes as opposed to just one 
outcome. Hindsight participants responded 
similar to foresight participants who have 
no prior knowledge of a research outcome. 
The hindsight bias was reduced when 
students were asked to consider alternative 
research outcomes. 
Davies (1987) conducted three 
experiments to demonstrate that the 
hindsight bias could be eliminated. In the 
first experiment, Davies presented students 
with four scenarios based on psychological 
studies. He asked participants to write 
notes about the studies and evaluate the 
scenarios. The students returned two weeks 
later and received one of four conditions. 
In the first condition, the investigator 
informed students of the outcomes of the 
scenarios, showed students their original 
notes, and then asked them to estimate the 
likelihood of the outcomes as if they had 
never known the outcome. In the second 
condition, the investigator gave the same 
instructions except that the students did not 
review their original notes. Experimenters 
then instructed the students to try and 
remember how they originally judged the 
outcomes prior to the outcome knowledge 
they received. In the third condition, 
students did not receive the outcomes, but 
they did review their original notes. In the 
forth condition, students did not receive the 
outcome and did not review their previous 
notes. All students were asked to make a 
probability judgment of the outcome while 
recalling what they had originally thought 
about the outcomes. 
Davies (1987) found that there was a 
hindsight bias. Students who reviewed the 
outcomes of the scenarios judged them as 
more probable than did students who did 
not review the outcomes. Davies 
demonstrated that helping people remember 
what they had originally thought prior to 
discovering the true research outcome 
could eliminate the hindsight bias. Lay 
judgments of research, therefore, are 
influenced by the information available in 
memory and the experiences of recalling 
that information. 
Subjective Experience 
Judgments are influenced by the 
content of information in memory and by 
the process by which the content is 
accessed. The experience of how easy or 
difficult information is called to mind can 
be just as important as the information 
recalled. Self-assessments, for example, 
are influenced by the ease with which one 
can recall examples related to that 
assessment (Schwarz, Strack, Bless, 
Klumpp, and Rittenauer-Schatka, 1991). 
Schwarz et al. manipulated subjective ease 
by asking students to generate either 6 or 
12 examples of times in their recent past 
when they were assertive (or unassertive). 
Generating 6 examples was considered an 
easy task whereas generating 12 examples 
was considered a difficult task. The 
researchers assumed that if students made 
judgments based solely on the content of 
their recollections, the more assertive 
examples they generated, the higher their 
self-ratings of assertiveness. If students 
considered the ease of recalling these 
assertive behaviors, then the difficult task 
ofrecalling 12 assertive examples would 
lower their self-ratings of assertiveness, and 
the easy task of recalling 6 examples would 
raise their self-ratings of assertiveness. 
Results showed that the more difficult it 
was to think of assertive examples, the 
lower students' self-assessments of 
assertiveness, and the more difficult it was 
to think of unassertive examples, the higher 
their self-assessments of assertiveness. 
Experienced ease of recalling instances of 
assertive or unassertive behaviors had a 
larger effect on self-assessments than did 
the number of instances recalled. People 
make judgments not only based on the 
content of the information they are judging 
but also based on the ease with which the 
content comes to mind. 
In other studies, memory accessibility 
effectively altered example recall 
(MacLeod & Campbell, 1992). The 
researchers used a mood induction 
procedure to manipulate ease of memory 
accessibility. Participants were placed in 
either a negative mood or a positive mood 
using a mood induction procedure. 
Experimenters presented participants with 
either a pleasant or an unpleasant event and 
asked them to recall a personal memory 
that would apply to that event. Participants 
then rated the future probability of 
experiencing the event in the future. 
The researchers hypothesized that 
recall times and probability judgments 
would be inversely related. The longer it 
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takes a person to think of examples, the 
less salient it is in memory; therefore, the 
probability of the event occurring in the 
future would seem unlikely. If the mood 
induction was successful, then recall times 
for pleasant events would be shorter for 
participants in a positive mood than 
for those in a negative mood, and recall 
times for unpleasant events would be 
shorter for people in a negative mood than 
for those in a positive mood (MacLeod & 
Campbell, 1992). 
The researchers found that there is a 
significant inverse relationship between the 
speed with which past memories of 
specified events can be recalled and the 
perceived probability of experiencing that 
event in the future (MacLeod & Campbell 
1992). Basically, those who recalled 
passed memories quicker rated them as 
more probable to occur in the near future. 
By using a mood induction process, the 
researchers were successful in modifying 
the ease with which positive and negative 
memories were recalled. This ease of recall 
subsequently influenced probability 
judgments. Students in a negative mood 
recalled unpleasant events faster and 
indicated that unpleasant events have a 
higher probability of occurring than 
pleasant events. The same pattern occurred 
for people in a positive mood recalling 
pleasant events. MacLeod and Campbell 
demonstrated that subjective experience can 
be manipulated and that differences in 
subjective experience influence judgments. 
Hypothesis 
Richard et al. (2001) found that lay 
people think obvious research results are 
important. One possible explanation for 
these findings is that lay people use the ease 
with which examples are called to mind 
when making judgments of obviousness and 
importance. This hypothesis was 
investigated in the current study. Groups of 
students read brief, type-written social 
psychological research findings. Students 
generated either one example or five 
examples for research findings. For each 
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finding, participants rated how easy it was 
to generate examples and how probable it 
was that similar examples would occur in 
the near future. The students also indicated 
whether each finding was obvious or not 
obvious, important or not important, and 
interesting or not interesting. After making 
these judgments for each finding, 
participants completed a one-page 
questionnaire that assessed their level of 
psychological knowledge. 
The current study attempted to 
manipulate subjective experience by 
including psychological findings previously 
categorized as being easy and difficult to 
think of examples and by utilizing an 
example generation manipulation. Students 
generated either one or five examples of 
research findings and then made judgments 
of obviousness, importance, and 
interestingness. The more difficult it is for 
students to think of examples of a research 
finding, the less obvious, important and 
interesting students will judge that finding. 
The findings for which more examples are 
requested will be judged as less obvious 
and important than findings for which 
fewer examples are requested. 
The current study attempted to replicate 
earlier results on the availability heuristic 
and to extend the research to lay judgments 
of research findings in the field of social 
psychology. If people know the outcome of 
psychological research, then they may call 
to mind easily accessible information to 
judge the probability of future occurrences. 
The present study evaluated the use of 
accessible information in memory to make 
obviousness, importance, and interest 
judgments about research outcomes. 
Findings for which examples are easily 
recalled will be judged as more obvious and 
important than findings for which examples 
are difficult to recall. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were undergraduate 
students currently enrolled in Introductory 
to Psychology courses at a southern 
university. One hundred thirteen students 
participated and received credit toward 
their grade (30 students in the pretest and 
83 in the primary study). An experimenter 
visited each Introductory Psychology class 
and briefly explained the study. Students 
were given the opportunity to sign up 
immediately or later on a psychology 
department bulletin board. All students 
were treated in accordance with APA 
ethical guidelines. 
Materials 
The findings presented to students 
represent a sample from Richard et al.'s 
(2001) study. By examining their data, the 
present research team observed the time 
students took to read and think of examples 
for each finding. Controlling for reading 
times, the 25 findings with the shortest 
response times were categorized as easy, 
and the 25 findings with the longest 
response times were categorized as 
difficult. These easy and difficult findings 
were selected for the current study. 
Pretest 
Experimenters recruited students from 
Introductory Psychology courses and 
conducted a pretest to establish whether the 
findings selected would be judged as easy 
or difficult. Thirty students completed a 
packet of 14 findings. The students made 
judgments indicating the ease with which 
examples came to mind on an eight-point 
Likert Scale anchored at one, Not at all 
Easy, and eight, Very Easy. The pretest 
participants rated a total of 50 findings. 
The ease ratings averaged across 
participants for each finding served as a 
measure of example generation ease. 
Students' ratings of ease were accumulated 
for each finding. Researchers selected the 
20 findings students rated most difficult to 
generate examples (M = 4.58, SD = .97) 
and the 20 findings students rated most 
easy to think of examples (M = 6.59, SD = 
.44). As a validity test on the sample of 
findings, those findings categorized as easy 
received higher ease of example generation 
ratings than findings categorized as 
difficult, t(38) = 8.43, p < .0005. Findings 
categorized as easy represent research 
outcomes for which students have examples 
readily available in memory. Findings 
categorized as difficult represent research 
outcomes for which students have few 
examples readily available in memory. 
Researchers also selected four findings as 
neutral findings with a mean ease rating of 
M = 5.16 (SD = .54). 
Primary Experiment 
Students read two neutral findings at 
the beginning of each sequence to become 
familiar with the task of generating 
examples. Each set of test materials 
consisted of an equal number of easy 
findings (e.g. "When people drink alcohol, 
they become aggressive") and difficult 
findings (e.g. "Sometimes a message has 
more persuasive impact after a delay"). 
Students viewed and judged an equal 
number of findings categorized as easy and 
as difficult. This served as a repeated-
measures factor in the current study. 
Appendix A lists the findings categorized as 
easy and difficult. 
The number of examples the 
participants generated served as an 
experimental manipulation. Researchers 
achieved the manipulation through the 
presentation of different survey forms. 
Half of the participants generated one 
example per research finding and the other 
half generated five examples per research 
finding. In the one-example condition, 
subjects viewed 22 findings, and in the 
five-example condition subjects viewed 12 
findings. In each condition, students spent 
approximately one hour completing the 
judgment task. 
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In order to control for presentation 
order, participants received the statements 
in one of two sequences. In the first 
sequence, the findings occurred in a fixed 
random order. The second sequence was 
the opposite of the first. In both sequences, 
students read the two neutral findings first 
to familiarize them with the task. The 
students then viewed the test findings. The 
materials did not distinguish between 
practice findings and test findings for the 
students. Figure 2 presents a diagram of 
the various presentation orders across 
groups of participants. 
After reviewing each finding, students 
rated the ease and probability of each 
finding based on an eight-point scale 
replicated from the pretest. For each 
finding, students judged whether the 
finding was obvious or not obvious, 
important or not important, and interesting 
or not interesting. Half of the participants 
received the judgments with the affirmative 
response stated first (e.g. Obvious or Not 
Obvious). The remaining half received the 
judgment choices in the opposite order (e.g. 
Not Obvious or Obvious). 
Once students completed the first set 
of materials, they completed an Experience 
with Psychology questionnaire. Students 
indicated their age, sex (either male or 
female), and classification (either 
freshmen, sophomore, junior, or senior). 
The questionnaire assessed the students' 
experience with psychology courses in 
high school and college by asking the 
students to write the number of courses 
they completed at each institution and to 
list the topics they studied. 
Procedure 
Participants for each session were 
directed to a room with two rows of six 
chairs. The participants read and signed the 
informed consent form and received 
instructions. The experimenter explained 
that the study would take at least one hour 
and that if at any time a participant decided 
not to continue, he or she could do so 
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without any penalty. The experimenter read 
the following instructions out loud: 
"The purpose of this study is to 
understand students' judgments of 
research findings. You will be given a 
number of findings. In the space 
provided, generate brief examples that 
apply to that finding. Any example is 
acceptable. If you feel that after some 
time you are struggling to generate an 
example, complete the remaining 
questions on the page and go on to the 
next finding. After thinking of 
examples, you will be asked additional 
questions about the finding." 
Participants then received the 
materials containing the research findings. 
In the one-example condition, students 
read each finding and listed one example 
per finding. Immediately after generating 
an example, students evaluated how easy it 
was to think of the example and how 
probable it was that the finding could 
occur in the near future. Following the 
ease and probability questions, students 
made obvious, important, and interesting 
judgments. The procedure was identical 
for the five-example group with the 
exception that students listed five examples 
for each finding rather than one. In both 
the one-example condition and the five-
example condition, students generated 
examples for findings previously rated as 
either easy or difficult. After the 
participants finished making judgments, 
they completed the Experience with 
Psychology questionnaire. The 
experimenter debriefed the participants. 
Results 
Two independent variables were used 
for the current study. The first independent 
variable was the number of examples 
requested (either one or five). The second 
independent variable was the expected ease 
of examples recalled (easy or difficult, as 
determined by the pretest). Students read 
both easy and difficult findings; therefore, 
this variable served as a within-subjects 
factor. The dependent variable was the 
proportion of students judging the findings 
as obvious and important. The data were 
evaluated in two forms: cross-participant 
analyses and cross-finding analyses. In 
some cases, the test of interest involved 
averaging students' responses across 
findings. Not all research findings are 
identical; therefore, some analyses involved 
averaging students' responses for a 
particular finding. 
Manipulation Check 
Analysis of each student's responses 
averaged across categories of easy and 
difficult findings revealed that students in 
fact rated the example generation task 
easier for findings previously categorized 
as easy (M = 5.95) than for findings 
categorized as difficult (M = 4.54), F(l,81) 
= 94.25, p < .0005. Students asked to 
generate one example found that task easier 
(M = 6.11) than students asked to generate 
five examples (M = 4.62), F(1,81) = 39.25, 
p < .0005. No interaction effects emerged 
in judgments of example generation ease 
(F < 1). See Figure 3. 
Replication of the Availability Heuristic 
Consistent with the availability 
heuristic, students rated findings in the easy 
category as more probable (M = 6.28) than 
findings in the difficult category (M = 4.6), 
F(1,81) = 163.47,p < .0005. Students 
asked to generate one example, however, 
found the findings only slightly more 
probable to occur in the future (M = 5.7) 
than students asked to generate five 
findings (M = 5.2) F(1,81) = 3.88, p = .052. 
No interaction effects were found in 
probability judgments (F < 1). The 
manipulation of the number of examples 
generated clearly affected students' 
experience with subjective ease; however, it 
did not clearly affect probability ratings 
(See Figure 4). 
Judgments of Research Findings 
The percentage of affirmative (e.g. 
obvious, important, etc.) judgments made 
by a participant in each of the example 
generation ease categories was observed. 
Consistent with the hypothesis, students 
were more likely to judge a finding in the 
easy category as obvious (M = 85%) than 
they were to judge as obvious findings in 
the difficult category (M = 50%), F(I,81) = 
138.38, P < .0005. According to the 
availability heuristic and research on the 
hindsight bias, findings for which examples 
come to mind easily would be judged as 
more obvious than findings for which 
examples do not. The manipulation of 
subjective ease, however, did not have the 
same effect. Students who generated one 
example (a subjectively easy task) were not 
more likely to judged findings as obvious 
than were students who generated five 
examples (a subjectively difficult task), 
F < 1. See Figure 5. 
Analysis of importance judgments 
revealed that students judged findings 
categorized as easy and those categorized 
as difficult as equally important, F(1 ,81) = 
.672, p = .415. In addition, students did not 
judge findings as more important in either 
the one-example condition or the five-
example condition. No interaction emerged 
for importance judgments (F < 1). 
Cross-Findings Judgments 
To evaluate students' judgments of 
research outcomes, the proportion of 
students indicating that a finding was 
obvious in one presentation order was 
compared to the proportion of students 
judging the same finding as obvious in the 
opposite presentation order. Results 
indicate that students agreed with what was 
obvious, important and interesting, 
Spearman Brown Split-Half Reliability r = 
.88, .71, .70, respectively. 
Richard et al. (2001) found a positive 
relationship between students' judgments of 
obviousness and importance of research 
findings. The previously observed 
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relationship was not replicated in the 
current study. The correlations between the 
proportion of students (across all 
conditions) judging a finding as obvious, 
important and interesting are presented in 
Table 1. Unlike previous research, no 
relationship was observed between the 
proportion of students who judged the 
finding as obvious and the proportion of 
students who judged the finding as 
important, r(38) = .09, p = .572. As might 
be expected from research on the 
availability heuristic, the proportion of 
students who judged a finding as obvious 
was positively correlated with the average 
example generation ease rating for the 
finding and the probability that similar 
examples would occur in the future, 
rs(38) = .89, .76, respectively, both 
ps < .0005. 
Discussion 
Consistent with the hypothesis, 
students rated findings as more obvious if 
the findings were easily called to mind. 
The results of the current study are 
consistent with Slovic and Fischoff's 
(1977) demonstration of the hindsight bias 
and extend Tversky and Kahneman's 
(1973) research of the availability heuristic. 
What is easily accessed in memory 
influenced a student's judgment of research 
outcomes. The results indicate that 
requiring students to generate several 
examples influenced the subjective 
experience of ease. The changes in 
subjective experience, however, only 
slightly influenced probability judgments 
and did not influence obvious judgments. 
A person's ease ratings of a finding were, 
however, influenced by the number of 
examples they generated. Students who 
generated only one example for a finding 
evaluated the generation of examples for a 
finding as easier than did students who 
generated five examples. The influence of 
example generation ease on obvious 
judgments suggests a heuristic strategy for 
making obvious judgments rather than a 
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systematic strategy. 
Schwarz (1998) examined previous 
studies in which people engaged in 
systematic processing when highly invested 
(or motivated) in a task and engaged in 
heuristic processing in tasks that were less 
relevant to the person. Rothman and 
Schwarz (1998) found that when people are 
motivated, they base their judgments on the 
content of information and engage in 
systematic processing to assess risk. The 
more relevant information that people had 
to recall about their health, the higher they 
assessed their health risk. People who were 
not highly motivated in a task engaged in 
heuristic processing and based their risk 
assessments on the ease with which they 
could recall examples. The less relevant 
information people had to recall about their 
health, the higher their health-risk 
assessment. 
When using a heuristic processing 
strategy, a person draws information from 
his or her subjective experience. People are 
more inclined to base their judgment on the 
content of the information when using 
systematic processing. In the current study, 
people tended to judge findings as easier to 
think of examples if they only had to 
generate one example. If students were 
using a heuristic processing strategy to 
judge research outcomes, then the ease with 
which examples came to mind would have 
influenced their obvious and important 
judgments. If a systematic process was 
used, then students who generated five 
examples would have rated the findings as 
more obvious. Our results show that 
judgments of obviousness were influenced 
by the subjective ease of example 
generation but not necessarily by the 
number of examples generated for a 
finding. Students who generated five 
findings, in fact, were less likely to judge 
the finding as obvious, even though they 
generated more examples of the finding. 
This result suggests that heuristic 
processing rather than systematic 
processing was being used to judge the 
obviousness of research. There was no 
evidence to suggest that experienced ease 
affected important or interesting judgments. 
Richard et al. (200 1) had found that 
findings students judged as obvious were 
also findings judged as important. The 
positive relationship between obviousness 
and importance was not replicated in the 
current study. Perhaps the populations used 
were different. Richard et al. tested 
students at Texas Christian University 
(TCU), a private, historically Christian, 
mid-sized university, and the current study 
tested students at the University of North 
Florida (UNF), a mid-sized public 
university. The people in these two regions 
of the country could respond to research 
outcomes differently. People vary in their 
motivations and their ability to consider 
alternative explanations when making a 
judgment (Kruglanski & Freund, 1983). 
People's motivation to consider other 
alternatives when forming a judgment is 
influenced by three separate needs: the 
need for structure, the fear of invalidity, and 
the need for specific closure. The need for 
structure motivates people to search for an 
answer to clarify ambiguity. This need is 
amplified when a person is forced to reach 
a clearly defined conclusion. The fear of 
invalidity motivates people to be correct so 
as not to receive negative social attention 
for being invalid. People who experience 
high fear of invalidity consider multiple 
alternatives and evaluate various 
explanations when attempting to solve 
problems. The need for specific 
conclusions motivates people to have 
clearly defined, plausible explanations for 
the events in their life. 
According to Kruglaski (1983), some 
people have a general tendency to seek out 
new information as opposed to just seeking 
out one answer. Only seeking one answer 
would suggest that a person has a high need 
for cognitive closure. Students at the UNF 
felt that obvious research findings were not 
necessarily important. This reasoning is 
more consistent with that of a scientist's 
thought process. Having a high need for 
cognitive closure may have motivated 
students in the TCU sample to engage in 
heuristic processing to quickly reach an 
answer, any answer. Students at UNF, 
alternatively, may have used more 
systematic processing in an effort to avoid 
invalidity. It would be beneficial to not 
only examine the differences between lay 
people and scientists, but to also observe 
the differences among lay people in 
different regions of the country. 
The current study has reinforced the 
idea that lay people utilize information that 
is easily accessible in memory to make 
judgments. The idea that people use their 
subjective experiences as process 
information to make judgments received 
support in the current study as well. When 
people can easily think of examples for a 
given research finding, they will consider 
the finding obvious. When scientists 
disseminate new information to the public 
they should consider using subjective 
experience to their advantage. Perhaps 
giving examples of the research findings 
that people can quickly call to mind will 
reinforce how the new information is 
pertinent to their lives. 
The results of this study will help 
establish a better understanding of the 
factors that influence judgments of research 
outcomes. The response scientists receive 
from the lay public about the obviousness 
and importance of the research can be 
influenced by how the information is 
presented and by the information about the 
finding people already have in memory. 
Many social psychological research 
outcomes may be important to society. 
When scientists discover an important 
finding, they will want to effectively 
communicate the new information to the 
lay public. 
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Appendix A: Findings Presented Previously Categorized as Easy and Difficult 
Easy Statements Mean 
When people drink alcohol, they engage in extreme behaviors. 7.57 
The members of a group influence one another. 7.25 
Women are more likely than men to perform care-taking tasks for others. 7.13 
Women are more skilled at expressing emotion than men. 7.00 
Leaders are most effective if they have charisma. 6.88 
People are likely to recycle if they know about recycling. 6.86 
When people drink alcohol, they become aggressive. 6.86 
Men are more likely than women to favor premarital sex. 6.86 
Dormitory crowding makes residents dissatisfied. 6.57 
People are unlikely to express their opinions without others' support. 6.57 
Taking a pretest improves a person's score on a posttest. 6.57 
People work less when in a group than when working alone. 6.43 
Students who have high self-esteem achieve a lot. 6.43 
Women are more likely than men to disclose personal information to others. 6.29 
Smiling increases happiness. 6.29 
Friends interact more positively with one another than non-friends. 6.29 
People remember negative events when they are depressed. 6.13 
People attribute their successes to effort. 6.00 
Boys are more competitive than girls. 6.00 
People are most likely to respond to surveys if they are offered monetary incentives. 6.00 
Difficult Statements Mean 
Jurors are harsh if the victim is an attractive Anglo-American female. 
Persuasive messages that provoke fear are able to induce attitude change. 
Negotiators are likely to compromise if they are experienced. 
Girls who are reared in father-absent homes are non-feminine. 
Experimenters find the research results they expect to find. 
Sometimes a message has more persuasive impact after a delay. 
A woman is likely to be held responsible for being raped 
if she was previously acquainted with her attacker. 
Teachers expect more from attractive than unattractive students. 
People with Type A personalities suffer chronic emotional distress. 
Empathetic people do not act negatively, antisocially, or abusively. 
Children who are helpful can infer others' motives and thoughts. 
Men attribute their performance to effort more than women. 
Leaders are most effective if they avoid making unnecessary changes. 
Nonverbal behavior quickly conveys accurate information about the actor. 
In the presence of others, people become physiologically aroused. 
Highly masculine men and highly feminine women 
have traditional attitudes toward women. 
A confident eyewitness gives accurate eyewitness testimony. 
There is consistency between people's attitudes and behavior. 
The most socially active people report the highest life satisfaction. 
People involved in intimate violence give undesirable self-descriptions. 
1.60 
3.57 
3.83 
3.88 
4.00 
4.17 
4.43 
4.43 
4.50 
4.71 
4.71 
4.75 
4.83 
5.00 
5.25 
5.29 
5.33 
5.71 
5.86 
5.86 
Osprey Journal of Ideas and Inquiry 125 
Table I 
Correlations Between Proportions of Students Judgments of Ease, Probability, Obviousness, 
Importance and Interest 
Judgment Ease Probability Obvious 
Ease .782* .890* 
Probability .759* 
Obvious 
Important 
* p < .0005 
Figure I. Strack's Model of Social Judgment 
EXPERIENCE 
STIMULUS INFO 
PROCESS INFO 
PROCESSING OBJECTS 
REPRESENTATIVENESS 
CHECK & CORRECTION 
JUDGMENT 
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Important Interesting 
.104 .071 
-.154 -.211 
.092 -.018 
.643* 
l 
EXPOSURE 
PHASE 
J 
l 
JUDGMENT 
PHASE 
J 
Figure 2. Presentation Order of Test Findings 
A.cross Different Experimental Conditions 
--------------.. Time 
One Example Condition 
Order I: Random 
Neutral Findings 
1-2 
or 
3-4 
Order II: Reverse of Order I 
Neutral Findings 
2-1 
or 
4-3 
Five Example Condition 
Order III: Random 
Neutral Findings 
1-2 
or 
3-4 
Order IV: Reverse of Order III 
Neutral Findings 
2-1 
or 
4-3 
Test Findings 
1-20 
Test Findings 
20-1 
Test Findings 
1-10 
or 
11-20 
Test Findings 
10-1 
or 
20-11 
Figure 3. Manipulation Check for Ease of Example Generation 
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6.5 
1 example 5 examples 
_Difficult Findings 
DEasy Findings 
Figure 4. Replication of the Availability Heuristic 
for the Probability of Future Occurrence 
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fe.s 
: !' 6.0 
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Number of Examples Generated 
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Figure 4. Replication of the Availability Heuristic 
for the Probability of Future Occurrence 
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